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We investigate the role of ownership structure and investor protection in 
postprivatization corporate governance. We find that the government relinquishes 
control over time, mainly to the benefit of local institutions and foreign investors.  We 
also show that private ownership tends to concentrate over time. In addition to firm-
level variables, investor protection, political and social stability explain the cross-firm 
differences in ownership concentration. We find that the positive effect of ownership 
concentration on firm performance matters more in countries with weak investor 
protection and that private domestic ownership leads to higher performance. 
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Postprivatization corporate governance: 
the role of ownership structure and investor protection  
 
1. Introduction 
Corporate governance is defined as a response to the agency problems that arise 
from the separation of ownership and control in a corporation. In this paper, we examine 
corporate governance within the context of privatization. Privatization provides an 
interesting setting in which to understand corporate governance, because it is a discrete 
event that often leads to a drastic change in the ownership structure. Thus, privatization is a 
natural experiment to examine how corporate governance mechanisms evolve, interact, 
and affect firm performance (Denis and McConnell, 2003).  
In this study, we investigate the relation between ownership structure, investor 
protection and firm performance. Specifically, we seek to answer the following questions: 
(1) What is the ownership structure that results from privatization and how does it evolve 
thereafter? (2) Does the level of investor protection influence the postprivatization 
ownership structure? (3) Does the postprivatization ownership structure depend on other 
factors? (4) How do ownership structure and investor protection relate to firm performance 
and what explains this relation?   
To our knowledge, our work is the first multinational study that tracks the 
postprivatization ownership structure and its determinants.1 Further, we examine how the 
ownership structure, a key mechanism of corporate governance, affects the 
postprivatization firm performance. 
                                                           
1 See Megginson and Netter (2001) and Djankov and Murrell (2002) for comprehensive surveys of 
empirical studies on privatization.   2
We consider a multinational sample of 170 newly privatized firms headquartered in 
26 emerging markets. For several reasons, emerging markets provide an excellent 
laboratory for studying the role of ownership and investor protection in postprivatization 
corporate governance. First, national legal systems vary markedly across emerging 
markets.  For example, most of these markets suffer from a poor legal environment and a 
weak enforcement of laws (La Porta et al., 1998).  Second, markets for corporate control 
are not well developed in emerging markets (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The deficiencies of 
these external governance mechanisms (i.e., the market for corporate control and the 
legal system) offer an interesting opportunity to investigate whether the ownership 
structure, an internal governance mechanism, plays an important role and interacts with 
the legal system to address the manager/shareholder postprivatization agency problem. 
Third, governments in most emerging market countries undertook large-scale privatization 
programs in the 1990s. With the recent trend towards globalization and the growing interest 
of investors in emerging markets, documenting and understanding postprivatization 
corporate governance in these countries takes on particular importance.      
We describe the ownership structure that emerges from privatization and examine 
how it evolves along two dimensions, the degree of ownership concentration and the 
identity of owners. Our findings suggest that following privatization, private ownership tends 
to concentrate over time. We also show that on average, privatization results in control 
relinquishment by the government. The decrease in the government ownership is mostly 
absorbed by local institutions, foreign investors and domestic individuals.  
We then investigate the determinants of the postprivatization private ownership 
c o nc e nt r at i on.   B ui l di ng  up o n De ms e t z  a n d  L e h n ( 198 5)  a nd  L a  P or t a et  a l.  ( 19 98 ) ,  w e  
include firm- and country-level explanatory variables and take into account the potential   3
selection effects resulting from the privatization process. Based on panel data, our results 
show that both sets of explanatory variables are important.  For example, we find that firm 
size, sales growth and industry affiliation as well as investor protection, political and social 
stability explain the cross-firm differences in ownership concentration.    
We empirically examine Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) theoretical claim that ownership 
concentration is an efficient governance mechanism in countries where investor protection 
is weak, and should therefore lead to an enhancement in firm performance.  We find that 
ownership concentration is significantly and positively related to the postprivatization firm 
performance.  This effect is more (less) pronounced when the level of investor protection is 
low (high). Our investigation of the association between the identity of owners and the firm 
performance suggests that performance is higher when local institutions and domestic 
investors are involved. 
Our paper complements the literature that examines the link between the design of 
privatization programs, postprivatization ownership structure and investor protection.   
Megginson et al. (2002) and Bortolotti et al. (2000) show that the choice of privatization 
methods (i.e., public share issues versus private asset sales) varies across countries and is 
influenced, among other factors, by the national legal environment.  Likewise, Dyck and 
Zingales (2002) show that privatizations are more likely to occur through private sales and 
ownership is more concentrated in countries where private benefits of control are larger, 
i.e., countries with weak legal protection.  Our evidence complements their findings by 
showing that ownership concentration is higher in civil law countries. This finding captures 
the fact that privatization occurs mainly through direct sales in these countries.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the relation between investor 
protection, privatization, and firm performance. Section 3 presents the data used in the   4
study. Section 4 documents the postprivatization evolution in ownership structure and 
investigates its determinants. Section 5 examines the link between the ownership and 
performance of newly privatized firms. Section 6 summarizes our findings.  
2. Investor protection, privatization and firm performance 
The standard principal-agent problem arises when the owner of the firm (the principal) is 
not the same as the manager that controls the firm (the agent). This problem is often put 
forward to explain the poor performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In this case, 
the separation problem involves the public (owner or taxpayers) and bureaucrats 
(politicians). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) describe this relationship as a situation in which 
bureaucrats retain concentrated control rights without cash flow rights, which are 
dispersed among the taxpayers of the country. In SOEs, the bureaucrats’ main concern is 
to achieve their political objectives, which do not necessarily converge with the profit 
maximization objective. Privatization transfers ownership to outside investors, who place 
greater emphasis on profits and efficiency (Boycko et al., 1996; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
Nevertheless, the ultimate success of privatization depends on the effectiveness of 
postprivatization corporate governance mechanisms.  The literature generally distinguishes 
two types of governance mechanisms: internal and external.  Internal mechanisms include, 
among other things, the ownership structure of the firm (e.g., large blockholders). External 
mechanisms include the legal system, and the labor and takeover markets. Several studies 
reviewed in Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Denis and McConnell (2003) examine the role of 
ownership structure and investor protection (internal and external mechanisms, 
respectively) in providing efficient corporate governance.  Unlike developed countries, 
many emerging market countries lack an established institutional framework for efficient   5
corporate governance. Such deficiencies point to the possibility that internal mechanisms 
may substitute to external mechanisms in providing efficient governance.   
In this paper, we focus on the role of two key dimensions of the ownership structure: 
the ownership concentration and the identity of owners. First, concentrated private 
ownership is more likely to ensure the success of privatization in countries with low investor 
protection. Large shareholders, whose wealth depends heavily on firm performance, have 
more incentives to monitor the managers and ensure that their resources are not diverted. 
Further, when privatization leads to a diffused ownership structure, the agency costs 
associated with managerial control may increase even when the costs of political control 
fall (Boycko et al., 1996).  
Second, the identity of owners is also likely to influence the performance of newly 
privatized firms (NPFs). For example, foreign investors require high information disclosure 
standards and, for reputation concerns, maintain a strict control of managers’ actions 
(Dyck, 2001). Institutional investors also exert a close monitoring of management activities 
to ensure superior returns (Boutchkova and Megginson, 2000).  
We also examine the relationship between internal (ownership structure) and 
external (investor protection) governance and the subsequent performance of NPFs. To do 
so, we use a multinational sample of firms diversified across countries and legal systems.  
3. Data and variables 
3.1. The sample of privatized firms 
To investigate the relation between investor protection, ownership structure, and firm 
performance, we use a sample of 170 firms privatized in 26 emerging market countries over   6
the period 1980-1997.2 Our sample does not include firms from the ex-communist countries 
for two reasons. First, the traditional law system in these countries is based on the Soviet law, 
which has undergone many changes in the transition period (La Porta et al., 2000). Second, 
the postprivatization ownership structure in these countries is mainly in the hands of insiders 
(managers and employees). 
    Table 1 shows that the 170 firms are located in different geographical regions as 
categorized by the World Bank. For example, 27.65 percent are from Africa and the Middle 
East, 27.06 percent from East and South Asia and the Pacific, 32.35 percent from Latin 
America, and 12.94 percent from Europe and Central Asia. The diversification across 
geographic regions is important, because it comprises countries with different legal and 
institutional environments.  
Table 1 also shows that the sample is diversified across industries, with 33.53 percent 
in the financial sector, 28.24 percent in the energy sector, and 11.18 percent in utilities. 
Furthermore, 77 percent of the privatizations occurred in the 1990s, which reflects the 
recent trend towards large-scale privatizations by emerging markets.  
When we classify our sample of NPFs by legal origin, we see that 37.65 percent of the 
firms come from common-law countries and 62.35 percent from civil-law countries. This 
diversification across legal origins allows us to examine whether the extent of investor 
protection helps explain the cross-firm differences in the postprivatization ownership 
structure.3  
                                                           
2 Our sample countries are either “major” or “frontier” emerging markets (Emerging Markets Data 
Base). 
3 Our sample largely represents the population of privatized firms in developing countries. By using 
the World Bank list of privatized firms in developing countries, we find that 30.48 percent of the firms   7
< Table 1 > 
3.2. Ownership variables 
To examine the postprivatization ownership structure and its determinants, we focus on two 
measures of private ownership concentration that are used in the literature (e.g., Demsetz 
and Lehn, 1985; La Porta et al, 1998; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001), the percentage of 
shares held by the three largest private investors, L3, and an approximation of the 
Herfindahl index (the sum of squared ownership shares by the three largest private 
investors), H3.  We apply a logistic transformation to L3, using the formula log(L3/(1-L3)) to 
convert a bounded variable to an unbounded one;  and a logarithmic transformation to 
H3. The resulting variables are LL3 and LH3.  Throughout this paper, we focus on the LL3 
measure of ownership concentration. However, our findings are robust to the use of LH3 as 
an alternative measure. 
To describe the postprivatization ownership structure and its evolution over time, we 
identify five groups of investors, the government, domestic institutions, foreign investors, 
employees, and individuals. We define the date of privatization as the date on which the 
government sold, for the first time, a certain amount of shares. We collect ownership data - 
from several sources from year –1 to year 3 around the privatization year. The main sources 
for privatization ownership data are the offering prospectus and annual reports, but we 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
are from Africa and the Middle East, 17.08 percent from East and South Asia and the Pacific, 42.35 
percent from Latin America, and 10.09 percent from Europe and Central Asia. We find that 20.52 
percent of the firms are from the financial sector and 15.97 percent are utilities. We also note that 80 
percent of the privatization transactions occurred in the nineties. Finally, when we examine the legal 
origin in the World Bank list the distribution shows that 31.12 percent of the firms come from common 
law countries and 65.27 percent from civil law countries.   8
also use additional sources such as Worldscope Disclosure, the Asian, Brazilian and Mexican 
Company Handbooks, as well as the Guide to Asian Companies.  
3.3. Performance variables 
We measure firm performance by the return on sales (net income to sales), the return on 
assets (net income to assets), and the return on equity (net income to equity) (Megginson 
et al., 1994; Boubakri and Cosset, 1998; D’Souza and Megginson, 1999). We obtain financial 
information from the firms’ financial statements, their web sites, and from databases such 
as  Worldscope Disclosure, Global Vantage, and Moody's International. Since we are 
examining the relation between the postprivatization firm performance and ownership 
structure, we compute the performance measures for a period of five years (from one year 
before to three years after privatization including the year of privatization itself). To check 
whether privatization leads to performance improvements, we also report the three-year 
average performance before and after privatization. 
4. Ownership structure 
 4.1.  Evolution of ownership structure 
Panel A of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the concentration of ownership 
measured by the cumulative number of shares of the three largest private investors and the 
Herfindahl index. The average number of shares held by the three largest shareholders 
increases from 10.64 percent before privatization to 38.57 percent in the year of 
privatization. Shareholdings continue to increase at a rate of 6.4 percent per year to 45.96 
percent after three years. In comparison, La Porta et al. (1998), using a sample of 49 
developed (24) and developing (25) countries, report an average ownership of the three 
largest shareholders of 46 percent in the 10 largest private nonfinancial firms.   9
We also report the evolution of the Herfindahl index of ownership concentration. Our 
results show higher levels of ownership concentration after privatization. The average index 
increases from 3.36 percent before privatization to 20.58 percent in the year of 
privatization. It continues to increase to 23.42 percent by the end of the third year.  Overall, 
the results presented here show that the private ownership of NPFs becomes more 
concentrated over time. 
Panel B of Table 2 reports changes in ownership by type of owner. The results 
indicate a significant change in the ownership structure of the sample firms following 
privatization. The average government stake declines substantially after privatization. We 
find a shift of 55 percent in the average government ownership (from 78.16 percent before 
privatization to 35.23 percent in the privatization year).  The average postprivatization 
government stake continues to decrease over the following three years to 21.41 percent.  
This finding is consistent with the predominance of partial, staggered sales (Perotti and 
Guney, 1993; Perotti, 1995). Although the government is the controlling shareholder (more 
than 50 percent of shares) in 82 percent of the sample firms before privatization, this 
percentage drops to 34 percent in the privatization year and to 20 percent after three 
years. Those firms that remain under government control three years after privatization 
come primarily (46 percent) from strategic sectors (e.g., utilities, telecommunications, 
airlines, and banking), and from East and South Asia and the Pacific region (82 percent), 
where partial privatizations are more common. Gupta (2002), for example, provide a 
comprehensive study of the Indian partial privatization program. 
Local institutions absorb much of the decrease in the state ownership. Their average 
stake increases from 4.68 percent prior to privatization to 19.17 percent in the year of 
privatization  and continues to increase up to 26.59 percent in the third year. These results   10
indicate the importance of local institutions as key players in the ownership structure of 
privatized firms. These findings complement Boutchkova and Megginson’s (2000) evidence 
for privatized firms in developed economies. 
Foreign investors’ average stake doubles in the year of privatization to 14.43 percent 
and continues to increase in the following three years to 16.26 percent. In a more detailed 
examination, unreported here, we find that on average, 60 percent of foreign investors are 
institutions. This finding could reflect the foreign ownership consolidation wave and the 
inflow of foreign consortiums following the financial liberalization that preceded or 
accompanied privatization (e.g., Latin American countries). 
To ensure employees’ support for the privatization policy, many governments 
allocate a fraction of the share issues (between 5 and 20 percent) to the firm’s employees 
through Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs). The average employees’ stake increases 
from 0.87 percent before privatization to 3.61 percent in the privatization year. However, 
we observe a decline in the average employees’ stake over the following three years.  This 
result could be explained by the existence of a lock up period during which employees are 
not allowed to sell their stake (Megginson et al., 1994). 
One objective of a privatization program is to widen ownership among individuals. In 
our sample of privatized firms, individuals’ average ownership increases from 3.17 percent 
before privatization to 14.50 percent in the year of privatization. At the end of the third 
year, the average stake held by individuals is 15.78 percent. This result suggests that 
privatization helps create a certain “equity culture” and ensures a minimum level of 
popular capitalism. For example, privatization in Malaysia has been driven to a large extent 
by the government’s willingness to increase the ownership share of Bumiputras in key 
sectors of the economy.   11
< Table 2 > 
4.2.  Investor protection and ownership structure  
To examine the evolution of the ownership structure according to the origin of commercial 
laws, we divide the sample into two groups: firms from common law countries and those 
from civil law countries. The rationale behind this partition is that common law countries 
provide a better investor protection that may influence the postprivatization ownership 
structure (La Porta et al., 1998). 
Panel A of Table 3 presents the changes in private ownership concentration by legal 
origin. Using both measures of ownership concentration, we show that the highest 
postprivatization concentration levels are found in countries with a poor investor protection 
(civil law countries). In the privatization year, the average stake held by the three largest 
shareholders is 49.03 percent for firms from civil law countries and 22.67 percent for firms 
from common law countries. Three years after privatization, the average stake held by the 
three largest shareholders is 28.64 percent and 58.42 percent for common law and civil law 
countries, respectively.  These postprivatization differences between the common law and 
civil law countries are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Panel B of Table 3 shows how ownership by the government, local institutions, foreign 
investors, employees, and individuals change and differ according to the legal origin of a 
given country. The average government stake is 77 percent prior to privatization for firms in 
common law countries, and 78.86 percent for firms in civil law countries. In contrast, the 
average government stake after privatization is statistically lower in civil law countries than 
in common law countries. The average government stake decreases by 50.77 percent in 
the privatization year for common law countries to 30.82 percent in the third year. For firms 
from civil law countries, the average government stake decreases by 57.40 percent in the   12
privatization year and continues to decrease to 15.65 percent in the third year. These results 
suggest that governments in civil law countries tend to sell higher stakes faster than do 
those in common law countries. 
The evidence on the changes in local institutions’ ownership suggests significantly 
higher levels of institutional ownership in countries with relatively poor investor protection 
(civil law countries) compared to countries with a better investor protection (common law 
countries). For the subsample of firms from common law countries the average stake is 
13.56 percent in the third postprivatization year and 35.58 percent for the subsample of 
firms from civil law countries. This result suggests that institutional investors may play a key 
role in countries with low investor protection. 
Before privatization, the average stake held by foreign investors is 13.64 percent for 
firms from common law countries and 2.37 percent for firms from civil law countries. The 
difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. In the year of privatization, the 
average foreign stake increases by 10.56 percent for the first subsample and almost fivefold 
for the second subsample. Three years after privatization, the average stake is 16.05 
percent for the common law countries subsample and 16.40 percent for the civil law 
countries subsample. The difference is not statistically significant. These results suggest that, 
ceteris paribus, foreign investors are drawn to privatized firms in emerging markets, 
regardless of the degree of legal protection in a country. 
We also explore how employees’ ownership is affected by the legal origin. The 
preprivatization employees’ average stake is higher for the subsample of firms from 
common law countries compared to the subsample of firms from civil law countries. 
However, this difference is not statistically significant.     13
We investigate the patterns of individuals’ ownership in both common law and civil 
law countries. Before privatization, the average stake held by individuals is 4.39 percent for 
firms from common law countries and 2.44 percent for firms from civil law countries. The 
results indicate that in common law countries, individuals own significantly higher levels for 
the privatization year and onwards. Three years after privatization, the average stake is 
30.39 percent for the common law subsample and 8.11 percent for the civil law subsample. 
Although we are unable to document the evolution in the number of shareholders, these 
results suggest that privatization is more likely to create a popular capitalism in common 
law countries than in civil law countries. In other words, wherever investors are protected by 
l a w ,  w e  c a n  e x p e c t   a n  “ e q u i t y  c u l t u r e ”  t o  e m e r g e  a n d  i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  h a v e  m o r e  
incentives to invest. 
< Table 3 > 
Overall, the results of Tables 2 and 3 indicate a high concentration of private 
ownership following privatization and support Shleifer and Vishny’ s (1997) and Dyck’ s 
(2001) contention that privatization should result in higher levels of concentrated ownership 
in countries with poor investor protection. The following section investigates the 
determinants of ownership concentration. 
4.3.  Determinants of ownership concentration 
Although the univariate results suggest that privatization yields higher levels of private 
ownership concentration in countries with a weak investor protection (civil law countries), 
the results only document bivariate relations.   
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) investigate the determinants of ownership concentration 
in the US. The authors find (1) a negative association between ownership concentration   14
and firm size; (2) a positive association between ownership concentration and profit 
instability; and (3) a lower ownership concentration in regulated firms (utilities and financial 
firms). Recent papers by Himmelberg et al., (1999), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), and 
Palia (2001) extend the Demsetz and Lehn analysis, and show that managerial ownership is 
endogenously determined by a set of firm-level variables in the contracting environment. 
La Porta et al. (1998) use country-level explanatory variables to explain ownership 
concentration in a wide set of developed and emerging markets. These authors measure 
ownership concentration in each country by the average ownership stake of the three 
largest shareholders in the ten largest publicly traded companies. They use several 
measures of legal protection including the quality of law enforcement, the shareholder 
rights, the creditor rights, and legal origin dummies, and find a negative association 
between the extent of legal protection and ownership concentration.  
While Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and La Porta et al. (1998) examine the determinants 
of ownership concentration of publicly traded firms, in this research we focus on the 
determinants of the postprivatization private ownership structure. We extend their empirical 
specifications by simultaneously including firm- and country-level explanatory variables, 
and we formulate our conjectures within the following equation 
it t it LCONC αϑ γ ε =+ + ++                 ,     (1) 
where LCONCit is the private ownership concentration measured by LL3, FLVit represents 
firm-level variables, CLVit represents country-level variables,  t γ are year fixed effects (i.e., an 
indicator for each postprivatization year) included to capture unobservable changes at 
the firm- and country-level, and εit is a disturbance term.   15
Table 4 summarizes the firm-level and country-level variables we consider. Following 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), we use the following firm-level variables displayed in Panel A:  
Operating risk, for which we use, as a proxy, the standard deviation of the annual return on 
equity ratios (RISK) during the three years preceding the privatization year; Growth, for 
which we use, as a proxy,  the average annual sales growth rate (SALESGR) during the 
three preceding years preceding the privatization year; Firm size, for which we use, as a 
proxy,  the natural logarithm of total sales (SIZE); and Industry affiliation. We include a 
dummy variable for each industry: IND1 for the finance industry, IND2 for utilities, IND3 for 
telecommunications, IND4 for oil and gas, petrol/petrochemical, cement and mining, and 
IND5 for other industries.  
In addition to the firm-level variables, we control for the timing of privatization. To do 
so, we include a dummy variable for privatization timing that takes the value of one if the 
sample firm is privatized after the median privatization date in the country, and zero 
otherwise (LATE). This variable captures the privatizing government’s preferences on the 
choice of the to-be-privatized firm and the extent of the stake sold. For example, because 
of social and political costs and for fear of losing revenues, governments could be reluctant 
to sell higher stakes and relinquish state control at early exploratory stages of the 
privatization program. Similarly, in an effort to attract private investors, governments might 
choose to relinquish control in the early stages. The empirical results will validate either one 
or the other of these arguments. 
Panel B presents the country-level variables.  Legal system refers to the legal origin of 
the country. This is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for common law countries   16
and zero otherwise (LAW).4  In civil law countries, governments tend to sell higher stakes 
using direct sales, which is more likely to yield a concentrated ownership (Dyck, 2001; 
Bortolotti et al., 2000). Thus, we expect a negative association between ownership 
concentration and ownership protection.  
As a proxy for legal enforcement, we use La Porta (1998) index of the efficiency of 
the judicial system (JUDICIAL). Strong legal enforcement could substitute for the weakness 
of rules since “active and well-functioning courts can step in and rescue investors abused 
by the management” (La Porta et al. 1998, p.1140). Thus, we expect a negative correlation 
between ownership concentration and legal enforcement.  
As a proxy for income inequality, we use the Gini index (GINI). Demsetz (1997) 
contends that a society’s wealth and its distribution are likely to explain ownership 
concentration. Demsetz claims that wealthy people are more likely to buy large stakes 
while still enjoying diversification of their wealth.  Therefore, we expect income inequality to 
have a positive impact on ownership concentration.  
As a proxy for the stability of the political environment, we use the index of 
government stability (GS) provided by International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This 
indicator measures the credibility and ability of the government to carry out declared 
economic reforms and privatization, which have the merit of reducing private investors’ 
worries about future policy reversals (Perotti, 1995; Perotti and van Oijen, 2001). Therefore, 
                                                           
4 The exogeneity of the legal origin dummy makes its use as a measure of investor protection 
appealing in contrast to other measures of investor protection such as the shareholder rights index 
that might be endogenous to ownership concentration (La Porta et al., 1998; Dyck, 2001).   17
we expect a positive association between private ownership concentration and political 
stability.  
As a proxy for the stability of the social environment, we use the index of ethnic 
tensions provided by ICRG (ET). This indicator measures the degree of tension within a 
country that is attributable to cultural, racial, nationality, or language divisions. These 
factors are all likely to adversely affect the business environment, private investors’ 
confidence, and their willingness to invest a large portion of their wealth. Therefore, we 
expect a positive association between private ownership concentration and the stability of 
the social environment.  
< Table 4 > 
Some of the variables we describe above try to act as proxies for the extent of 
selection effects inherent to the privatization process. In the context of privatization, we 
must deal with the likelihood that a government’s choices affect the resulting ownership 
structure. Given the prevailing economic and institutional environment, the privatizing 
government may privatize (keep) or sell higher (lower) stakes in better-quality firms, which 
could result in a more (less) concentrated private ownership in these firms. Moreover, the 
government might be reluctant to relinquish control in large firms and/or in sectors that it 
believes are economically and politically strategic. Finally, certain types of owners (e.g., 
local institutions, foreign investors) may be able to identify better-quality firms from 
institutionally healthier countries. All these cases suggest that the private ownership 
concentration that emerges after privatization is likely to be systematically related to 
unobservable firm- and country-characteristics in addition to observable firm- and country-
characteristics.    18
We can control for this unobservable firm and country heterogeneity in panel data. 
Since our study is multinational, and given that some of our main country-level variables are 
invariant within firms and countries,   we assume that we can capture firm (country) 
unobservable heterogeneity by introducing industry- (and region-) fixed effects. We believe 
that a particular firm (country) exhibits the same characteristics as the whole industry 
(region). Governments generally privatize firms from particular industries using the same 
timing and sales methods. These practices are also common to countries from a particular 
region.   
Table 5 reports the regression results for estimating Equation (1). We find that the 
growth variable SALESGR is positive and significantly (at the 1 percent level) related to 
ownership concentration. This finding is consistent with the fact that firms with high growth 
prospects are more attractive. We find a negative and significant (at the 1 percent level) 
relation between ownership concentration and firm size. That is, an increase in the firm’s 
size leads to an increase in the level of ownership dispersion.  
Our results also show significantly higher levels of ownership concentration for 
financial firms. One possible explanation for this finding is that the financial liberalization 
that accompanied or preceded privatization created a wave of foreign ownership 
consolidation, particularly in Mexico and other Latin American countries.  
Our results also indicate significantly lower levels of ownership concentration for 
utilities and telecommunications. This evidence supports the previous discussion on the 
monitoring role of regulation and the reluctance of the government to fully privatize 
strategic industries. We note that neither the operating risk of the firm nor the privatization 
timing variable is significantly related to ownership concentration.   19
At the country level, the results show several significant relations. Specification (1) 
contains region-fixed effects. Specifications (2) through (4) contain interaction between 
regions and county-level variables.  We find a negative and significant (at the 5 percent 
level) association between ownership concentration and the level of investor protection 
across all the specifications. Firms in civil law countries exhibit a level of ownership 
concentration that is higher than that for firms in common law countries. These results 
confirm those in Table 3 (Panel A) and suggest that, after controlling for firm and country 
characteristics, ownership concentration is significantly higher in civil law countries.  
The legal enforcement variable JUDICIAL is not a statistically significant determinant 
of ownership concentration. One possible explanation for this result is that legal 
enforcement is irrelevant in emerging markets and does not substitute for the weakness of 
rules.  We also find that the measure of income inequality GINI is not significantly related to 
ownership concentration.  However, specification (2) shows that the impact of income 
inequality is positive and significant (at the 1 percent level) in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the region that exhibits the highest income inequality.5   
As predicted,  we find that the government stability GS and ethnic tensions ET 
variables are key determinants of private ownership concentration. This result suggests that 
private investors are more inclined to hold larger stakes of firms in more stable political and 
social environments.   
Specifications (3) and (4) indicate that the interactions between regions and 
government stability GS, and between regions and ethnic tensions ET, are positive and 
                                                           
5 Over the 1980-2000 period, the average index of income inequality (GINI) for Latin America and 
the Carribean is 57, compared to 41 for Africa and the Middle East, 40 for Europe and Central Asia, 
and 38 for East and South Asia and the Pacific.     20
significant (at the 1 percent level) for Latin America and both Latin America and Europe, 
respectively.  
In all regressions, none of the year effects is significant. Overall, the results indicate 
that firm- and country-level explanatory variables explain at least 49 percent of the 
variation in ownership concentration. These results confirm the endogeneity of private 
ownership concentration and the necessity to take it into account when testing the 
ownership-performance relationship.  
The results can also be related to the patterns of government ownership reported in 
Panel B of Table 3, which show higher levels of postprivatization government ownership for 
firms in common law countries. Governments in emerging markets seem to privatize higher 
stakes when there is a poor investor protection, which is more likely to lead to a higher 
private ownership concentration. This result could also explain why privatization methods 
tend to vary across countries.  
The empirical evidence on the privatization methods appears to be mixed. 
Megginson et al. (2002) show that privatization through private sales is more likely when the 
investor protection is better (common law countries), but Bortolotti et al. (2000) report a 
higher frequency of direct sales in civil law countries. Dyck and Zingales (2002) examine the 
effects of private benefits of control on the development of markets, particularly on the 
ownership structure of firms and the choice of privatization methods. The authors show that 
countries that exhibit higher benefits of control, i.e., countries with weak legal protection, 
have more concentrated ownership. In these countries, privatization is less likely to occur 
through public offerings.    21
Our evidence, drawn exclusively from emerging markets, concurs with this line of 
research on the link between the design of privatization programs, postprivatization 
ownership structure, and investor protection: we show that postprivatization ownership 
concentration is higher in countries where investor protection is weak. This evidence 
indirectly captures the fact that privatization occurs mainly through direct sales in these 
countries (e.g., in Africa and Latin America). 
< Table 5 > 
5. Ownership, investor protection, and performance 
5.1. Operating performance of privatized Firms 
 As proxies for the operating performance of NPFs, we use the return on sales (ROS), the 
return on assets (ROA), and the return on equity (ROE) ratios. Table 6 reports the mean and 
median levels of performance from one year before to three years after privatization, and 
the mean and median changes in performance from the preprivatization (years –3 to -1) to 
the posprivatization(years 1 to 3) periods.  
The performance measures tend to increase following privatization. For example, the 
mean (median) ROS increases from 9.9 (6.4) percent for year –1 to 12.8 (9.6) percent for 
year 0. Three years after privatization, the mean (median) ROS is 6.2 (9.2) percent. 
Furthermore, the changes in the performance measures over the window [-3, -1; +1, +3] are 
significant and  positive. For example, the median changes in ROS and ROE are 3.9 percent 
and 3.7 percent, respectively, but the median change in ROA is 1.1 percent.6 
                                                           
6 To account for contemporaneous economy-wide factors that might affect the performance 
indicators, we compute market-adjusted measures using a control sample of firms that are privately   22
< Table 6 > 
5.2. The Relation between ownership concentration, investor protection, and performance  
Ownership concentration, by establishing a strong relation between ownership and control, 
helps mitigate the extent of agency problems in a firm and should yield a superior 
performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). A standard approach is to conduct a regression 
analysis of the firm performance on ownership structure variables. However, this method 
can be misspecified if some of the unobserved determinants of firm performance 
(unobserved heterogeneity) also explain the ownership concentration variables, leading to 
a spurious relation between ownership concentration and firm performance. Several 
recent studies (e.g., Himmelberg et al., 1999; Palia, 2001) document the endogeneity 
nature of the ownership structure (predominantly managerial ownership) and stress the 
need to control for it by using instrumental variables for ownership. Accordingly, we 
estimate the following system of equations 
12 1 1 1 * it it it it PERF LCONC LCONC PROTEC δθ θ β ϑ γ ε =+ + + + + +                     ,   (2a) 
    222 it it LCONC αϑ ε =+ + +                                 ,                          (2b) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
owned over the analysis period. The results, not reported but available from the authors, show that 
the mean (median) market-adjusted performance before privatization is negative for all indicators, 
suggesting that previously state-owned enterprises underperform with respect to other firms in the 
market. However, the mean (median) market-adjusted performance following divestiture becomes 
positive and significant at the 1 percent level for all three indicators, which confirms the positive 
impact of privatization on performance.   23
where PERFit stands for the performance of firm i (ROS, ROA, ROE) at time t, LCONCit is the 
ownership concentration of firm i at time t as measured by LL3, FLV1it (firm size  SIZE and 
industry dummies) and CLV1it (economic freedom FREEDOM and GDP growth GDPG) 
represent firm- and country-level control variables included in the performance equation. 
Including the GDP growth in the performance equation allows us to indirectly control for 
the possible impact of economic reforms on firm performance (Bekaert et al., 2001). 
Including economic freedom allows capturing the cross-country differences in the 
institutional environment.  t γ  are year dummies introduced to control for year specific 
effects.  FLV2it and CLV2it represent firm- and country-level instrumental variables (Zit) 
included in the ownership concentration equation, and ε1it and ε2it are the error terms.  
The choice of the instruments is a crucial task since they must be highly correlated 
with ownership concentration but must not determine firm performance. We use the set of 
instruments from specification (1) in Table 5 (RISK, SALESGR, SIZE, LATE, LAW, GINI, GS, ET). 
These instruments must satisfy E[ε1it,  Zit] = 0. Since firm size explains both ownership 
concentration and firm performance, we use the (logarithm of) total GNP on the ground 
that larger economies have larger firms and therefore, lower ownership concentration (La 
Porta et al., 1998). 
The parameter θ1 in Equation (2a) measures the impact of ownership concentration 
on the performance of privatized firms.  We also introduce an interaction term between 
ownership concentration and investor protection. If the effect of ownership concentration 
on performance is more pronounced in countries with poor investor protection, then the 
coefficient of the interaction term (θ2) should be negative and significant.  We measure 
investor protection using the PROTEC variable, which refers to a country’s law and order 
score from ICRG.     24
Within a two-stage least squares (2SLS) framework, we estimate equations (2a) and 
(2b).  In the first stage, we estimate the equation of the determinants of ownership 
concentration, LCONCit, and obtain the fitted (estimated) values (with industry- and region-
fixed effects). In the second stage, we use these fitted values of ownership concentration 
as instruments for LCONCit (Equation 2a) to estimate the impact of ownership 
concentration on firm performance. 
We estimate three specifications of Equation (2a) and report the estimation results in 
Table 7. The results of the regression that restrains the parameter θ2 to zero (specification (i)) 
suggest that after we control for firm size and industry, cross-country differences in the 
institutional environment and economic growth, ownership concentration is significantly 
related to firm performance.7 This result supports Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) contention that 
postprivatization diffused ownership structure (and thus an increase in agency costs of 
managerial control) may lead to disappointing performance.  Further, FREEDOM is positive  
and significantly related to performance, while GDP growth is positively but less significantly 
correlated with performance. The positive effect of FREEDOM suggests that firms achieve 
higher performance improvements when they are privatized in an institutionally healthier 
environment. The negative and significant coefficient estimate for SIZE suggests that small 
SOEs are more likely to adapt to a change in the environment.  
We also control for industry characteristics and year-specific effects. An F-test for 
testing the null hypothesis of equal effects through industries shows a strong rejection for all 
specifications. An examination of industry effects indicates a superior performance for 
                                                           
7 We use ROS as our measure of firm performance. The results with ROA or ROE, which are available 
from the authors, are qualitatively similar.   25
noncompetitive firms (i.e., utilities and telecommunications) and for firms from the financial 
sector. None of the year effects is significant in the three specifications.  
We estimate an alternative specification (ii) of equation (2a) that does not restrain to 
zero the parameter θ2 to allow for an interaction between ownership concentration and 
investor protection. We note that performance and ownership concentration continue to 
be positively and significantly correlated.  
More important, we find that the interaction variable LCONC*PROTEC has also a 
negative and significant impact on performance. This finding suggests that even though 
concentration has a positive impact on performance, the effect is stronger wherever 
investor protection is weaker. The result also supports the belief that in emerging markets, 
ownership concentration can substitute for investor protection and provide the functions of 
corporate governance.  
We also show that PROTEC has a negative and significant effect on performance, 
suggesting that firms in countries with low investor protection perform better. This result 
should be interpreted together with the previous findings on the impact of ownership 
concentration and its interaction with investor protection on firm performance. To 
compensate for the lack of an efficient legal system, investors in countries with poor 
investor protection rely on governance structures that are basically dominated by highly 
concentrated ownership. SIZE has a significant and negative effect on performance. The 
country-level control variables indicate that FREEDOM remains positive and significant, but 
GDPG is insignificant. 
Several authors provide evidence of nonlinearities in the ownership-performance 
relation  (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Claessens and Djankov, 1999;   26
Himmelberg et al., 1999). To check for this possibility, we extend specification (ii) to include 
the instrumented LCONC and its squared variable (LCONC)2 in specification (iii). We find 
that the estimated coefficient of the squared term (LCONC)2 is positive and significant at 
the 1 percent level.   
Throughout the three specifications, we check whether the error term is uncorrelated 
with the instrumental variables Zit, that is, E[ε1it Zit] = 0. The F-statistics reported in the last 
column of Table 7 imply that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no correlation 
between the error terms and instruments, suggesting that our system of equations is 
properly identified.  
The use of the instrumental variable approach might also suggest that we are 
measuring the effect of one or more particular instruments on firm performance rather than 
the effect of ownership concentration on firm performance (Palia, 2001). We check for this 
possibility by regressing firm performance on the instruments Zit. The results, not reported 
here but available from the authors, show that only the instrument RISK is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. The adjusted R2 of 2.1 percent is very low compared to 
26.3 percent obtained in the regression of ownership concentration on these instruments. 
When we conduct an F-test for the joint insignificance of the instruments, we find a 
rejection at the 5 percent level for the performance regression (F-statistic = 2.58, p-value = 
0.0129) and 1 percent level for the ownership concentration regression (F-statistic = 22.44, 
p-value = <.0001). These results suggest that our instrumental variable approach mainly 
captures the effect of ownership concentration on firm performance. 
< Table 7 >   27
5.3. The relation between ownership identity and performance  
So far, we have examined only the relation between ownership structure and firm 
performance along the ownership concentration dimension. However, the identity of 
owners could also be relevant in analyzing the postprivatization ownership-performance 
relation (Boycko et al., 1996; Dyck, 2001).   Different types of owners may have distinct 
incentives and abilities to control the postprivatization managers. Therefore, it is ultimately 
the extent of this control that determines the firm’s performance. Thus, we assess the 
impact of the different types of owner, as identified in Section 4 on the performance of 
NPFs. 
To do so, we perform a multivariate regression analysis in which we use the shares 
held by various stakeholders while controlling for the firm’s size, and the country’s 
institutional environment and economic growth. We formulate the following set of 
equations 
11 1 it j ijt it
j
PERF OWNER δθ β ϑ γ ε =+ + + + + ∑                     ,      (3a) 
22 ijt it OWNER αϑ ε =+ + +                                         ,        (3b) 
where OWNERijt is the percentage of shares held by the owner of type j (j = 1,2, 3, 4) of firm i 
at time t. 
To estimate the system of equations (3a and 3b), we instrument each type of owner 
OWNER u s i n g  t h e  s a m e  s e t  o f  i n s t r u m e n t s  a s  i n  e q u a t i o n  ( 2 b ) .  O u r  i d e a  i s  t h a t  t h e  
percentage held by certain types of owners could be endogenously determined by public 
information released from the privatization process.    28
Panel B of Table 7 reports the results from the estimation of equations (3a and 3b). 
First, local institutions’ ownership has a significant, positive impact on the firm’s 
performance, suggesting that local institutions are an effective mechanism of the 
postprivatization corporate governance. We also show that ownership by individuals has a 
significant, positive influence on performance. Taken together, our results suggest that local 
outsiders provide beneficial restructuring.  
Surprisingly, our results suggest no significant association between firm performance 
and foreign ownership. At first sight, this result is puzzling, because it contradicts the 
theoretical contentions of Boycko et al. (1996) and Dyck (2001) that foreign investors are a 
source of better governance and higher performance. Yet, Frydman et al. (1999) find a 
similar result in that domestic outsiders do better than foreign investors in newly privatized 
firms in the Czech Republic. The authors argue that perhaps foreign owners are not initially 
at ease in an environment that is relatively unknown to them, and that the transfer of know-
how may require more time than their sample period allows.  
We find no significant relation between the firm’s performance and employee   
ownership. To some extent, this result does not disagree with Boycko et al’s (1996) 
prediction that employees make poor stockholders/monitors. For the control variables, we 
find that the levels of institutional and economic development are positively related to firm 
performance. None of the time effects is significant. The F-statistics reported in the last 
column of Panel B indicate  that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no correlation 
between the error terms and the instruments.    29
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the relation between investor protection, ownership structure, 
and firm performance. Our sample comprises 170 firms from 26 emerging markets that were 
privatized during the 1980-97 period.  
First, our results show a significant decrease in the government ownership in the year 
of privatization; the postprivatization government share continues to decrease in the 
following three years. Much of the decrease in the government ownership is absorbed by 
local institutions , foreign investors  and individuals.  
Second, we find that firm-level variables, i.e., size, sales growth, and industry 
affiliation, and country-level variables, i.e., investor protection, and political and social 
stability, are key variables in explaining the cross-firm differences in ownership 
concentration.  
Finally, using a methodology that controls for the endogeneity of ownership, we 
show that firm ownership concentration is positively related to firm performance. We find 
that the effect of ownership concentration on firm performance is stronger in those 
countries where investor protection is weaker.  These results suggest that ownership 
concentration is a key mechanism of corporate governance in such countries. Further, the 
identity of owners seems to matter for firm performance, as performance is higher when 
local institutions and domestic investors are involved. 
Taken together, our results, obtained in the context of privatization, shed light on the 
functioning of corporate governance in emerging markets, particularly the role of 
ownership concentration and investor protection. Our results should also provide a new 
perspective for the ongoing debate on corporate governance reforms. Although   30
ownership concentration is an effective internal mechanism of corporate governance, it 
marginalizes (as suggested by several researchers, e.g., Holmström and Tirole, 1993) other 
external mechanisms of corporate governance (e.g., development of financial markets). 
Ownership concentration also impedes any effort to improve the efficiency of other 
institutions for corporate governance (e.g., legal institutions).      
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Table 1 
Description of the sample of newly privatized firms from emerging markets 
This table provides some descriptive statistics for the sample of 170 privatized firms used in this study. We 
report the distribution of privatizations in the countries included in the sample by year, industry, legal 
origin, and region. 
Distribution of privatizations 
By year    By industry 
Year   Number    Percentage    Industry  Number    Percentage 
1980 1  0.59  Financial    57 33.53 
1981 1  0.59  Utilities  19 11.18 
1985 4  2.35  Telecommunication  13  7.65 
1986 4  2.35  Energy  48 28.24 
1987 3  1.76  Other  industries  33 19.41 
1988 3  1.76  Total  170  100 
1989 23  13.53  By  Legal  Origin 
1990 14  8.24  Category  (countries)  Number    Percentage 
1991  26  15.29  Common law countries (11)  64  37.65 
1992  20  11.76  Civil law countries (15)  106  62.35 
1993 12  7.06  Total  (26)  170  100 
1994  17  10.00  By Region * 
1995 7  4.12  Region  (countries)  Number    Percentage 
1996  16  9.41  Africa and the Middle East (8)  47  27.65 
1997  19  11.18  East and South Asia and the Pacific (8)  46  27.06 
      Latin America and the Caribbean (8)  55  32.35 
      Europe and Central Asia (2)  22  12.94 
Total 170  100  Total  (26)  170  100 
* World Bank country group classifications.  
 
    
Table 2 
The evolution of ownership structure in newly privatized firms from emerging countries 
This table presents summary statistics on the evolution of the ownership structure for a sample of 170 
firms from 26 emerging countries privatized between 1980 and 1997. Panel A describes the ownership 
concentration measured by the percentage of shares held by the three largest investors (L3) and the 
Herfindahl index (H3). Panel B describes the evolution of ownership by type of investor. We consider five 
types of investors: the government, local institutions, foreign investors, employees, and individuals. The 
preprivatization ownership data (one year before privatization) come mainly from the offering 
prospectus, while the postprivatization data (year 0 to year 3) come from the annual reports and other 
additional sources such as Asian, Brazil and Mexico Company Handbooks, Worldscope Disclosure and 
The Guide to Asian Companies. All statistics are presented in percent. N refers to the number of 
observations.  
 
Ownership share after privatization 
(year relative to privatization) 
Type of investor 
Ownership 
share one year 
before 
privatization  0 +1  +2 +3 
Panel A. Private ownership concentration  
 Cumulative share of the three largest investors (L3) 
Mean 10.64  38.57  42.85  45.55  45.96 
Median 0.00  36.00  40.00  42.91  45.00 
N 148  131  141  137  110 
 Herfindahl index (H3) 
Mean 3.36  20.58  21.87  23.12  23.42 
Median 0.00  9.61  11.50  14.47  15.48 
N 150  130  141  137  110 
Panel B. Type of investor  
Government 
Mean   78.16  35.23  30.22  25.02  21.41 
Median 88.60  30.00  20.00  12.60  0.00 
N 169  169  161  150  137 
Local Institutions 
Mean   4.68  19.17  22.83  23.84  26.59 
Median 0.00  1.25  8.83  10.00  8.61 
N 120  109  124  123  98 
Foreign Investors 
Mean   6.89  14.43  15.93  17.70  16.26 
Median 0.00  0.00  2.20  4.96  3.90 
N 137  136  142  136  117 
Employees 
Mean   0.87  3.61  3.51  3.08  2.55 
Median 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
N 131  126  120  109  95 
Individuals 
Mean   3.17  14.50  16.14  16.17  15.78 
Median 0.00  8.60  10.00  9.50  8.47 
N 118  111  118  112  90 
    
Table 3 
The evolution of the ownership structure in newly privatized firms from emerging markets 
classified by law origin 
This table presents the evolution of the ownership structure for a sample of 170 firms from 26 emerging 
countries privatized between 1980 and 1997 according to the law origin. In Panel A, we focus on the 
ownership concentration measured by the percentage of shares held by the largest three investors (L3) 
and the Herfindahl index (H3). Panel B describes the evolution of ownership by type of investor: the 
government, local institutions, foreign investors, employees and individuals. We split the sample in two 
groups of firms, those from common law countries; and those from civil law countries. The 
preprivatization ownership data (one year before privatization) come mainly from the offering 
prospectus, while the postprivatization data (year 0 to year 3) come from the annual reports and other 
additional sources such as Asian, Brazil and Mexico Company Handbooks, Worldscope Disclosure and 
The guide to Asian Companies. The table also reports the p-value of the t-statistic for differences in 
means (p-value1) and medians (p-value2) between common law and civil law countries. All statistics are 
presented in percent. All tests have been conducted with at least 30 observations. 
 
Ownership share after privatization 
(year relative to privatization) 
Type of investor 
Ownership 
share one year 
before 
privatization  0 +1  +2  +3 
Panel A. Private ownership concentration  
 Cumulative share of the three largest investors (L3) 
Common law countries 
Mean 13.97  22.67  26.07  28.09  28.64 
Median 0.00  23.75  31.19  32.00  31.69 
Civil law countries 
Mean   8.29  49.03  54.57  56.57  58.42 
Median 0.00  52.00  55.43  59.00  60.20 
 
Means  difference  5.68  -26.36 -28.49 -28.48 -29.78 
P-value 1 0.072  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
P-value 2 0.114  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 
 Herfindahl index (H3) 
Common law countries 
Mean    4.55  6.95 7.64 8.49 8.39 
Median  0.00  3.02 5.23 6.27 6.11 
Civil law countries 
Mean 2.54  29.37  31.81  32.36  34.22 
Median 0.00  17.21  26.00  25.50  26.96 
 
Means difference  2.02  -22.43 -24.17 -23.86 -25.83 
P-value 1  0.085  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
P-value 2  0.095  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Panel B. Type of investor  
Government 
Common law countries 
Mean   77.00  37.91  37.42  33.09  30.82 
Median 79.50  35.47  38.91  30.25  30.00 
Civil law countries 
Mean 78.86  33.60  25.72  19.94  15.65 
Median 89.10  28.60  12.96  0.00  0.00 
 
Means difference  -1.86  4.31  11.70  13.15  15.17 
P-value 1 0.632  0.393  0.020  0.008  0.002 
P-value 2 0.749  0.345  0.019  0.003  0.001    
Table 3 (continued) 
 
 
Ownership share after privatization 
(year relative to privatization) 
Type of investor 
Ownership 
share one year 
before 
privatization  0 +1  +2  +3 
Local Institutions 
Common law countries 
Mean   4.18  8.38  10.82  11.84  13.56 
Median  0.00  0.00 3.11 3.78 3.11 
Civil law countries 
Mean 5.04  26.48  30.94  31.26  35.58 
Median 0.00  6.20  17.76  16.00  23.16 
 
Means  difference  -0.86  -18.10 -20.12 -19.42 -22.03 
P-value 1 0.705  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.001 
P-value 2 0.634  0.007  0.004  0.005  0.015 
 
Foreign investors 
Common law countries 
Mean   13.64  15.08  15.97  16.53  16.05 
Median  0.00  1.73 5.95 7.65 9.02 
Civil law countries 
Mean 2.37  14.04  15.91  18.38  16.40 
Median  0.00  0.00 0.54 0.96 0.54 
 
Means difference  11.27  1.04  0.06  -1.85  -0.35 
P-value 1 0.000  0.784  0.987  0.656  0.935 
P-value 2 0.000  0.312  0.330  0.410  0.231 
 
Employees 
Common law countries 
Mean    1.12  3.70 3.61 3.07 3.21 
Median  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Civil law countries 
Mean  0.72  3.55 3.45 3.09 2.23 
Median  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Means difference  0.40  0.15  0.16  -0.02  0.97 
P-value 1 0.530  0.938  0.939  0.993  0.657 
P-value 2 0.082  0.074  0.058  0.093  0.269 
 
Individuals 
Common law countries 
Mean   4.39  27.38  28.59  29.56  30.39 
Median 0.00  19.30  22.00  22.50  23.91 
Civil law countries 
Mean  2.44  7.53 9.01 9.01 8.11 
Median  0.00  0.00 4.00 1.74 0.00 
 
Means difference  1.95  19.85  19.59  20.55  22.28 
P-value 1 0.229  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
P-value 2 0.575  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
    
Table 4 
Summary of the variables 
This table describes the variables used in our regression analysis to investigate the determinants of the 
postprivatization private ownership concentration. 
Variables       Definition 
Panel A. Firm-level variables 
RISK  The standard deviation of the annual return on equity ratios. 
SALESGR  Sales growth. 
SIZE  The natural logarithm of total sales. 
IND1  A dummy variable equal to unity if the firm is a bank or insurance company. 
IND2  A dummy variable equal to unity if the firm is a utility. 
IND3  A dummy variable equal to unity if the firm is a telecommunication company. 
IND4 
A dummy variable equal to unity if the firm belongs to oil and gas, petrol/petrochemical, 
cement and mining. 
IND5  A dummy variable equal to unity if the firm belongs to other industries.   
LATE 
A dummy variable equal to unity if the sample firm is privatized after the median 
privatization date in the country and zero otherwise. 
Panel B. Country-level variables 
LAW  A dummy variable equal to unity for firms from common law countries. 
JUDICIAL  La Porta’s (1998) index of the efficiency of the judicial system. 
GINI  The United Nation’s index of income inequality. 
GS  The ICRG assessment of a country’s government stability. 
ET  The ICRG assessment of a country’s ethnic tensions. 
    
Table 5 
The determinants of private ownership concentration 
The table shows the regression results of private ownership  concentration measured by the logistic transformation 
of the percentage held by the three major shareholders (LL3) on the set of explanatory variables indicated below. 
REGION1, REGION2, REGION3 and REGION4 refer to Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Europe, respectively. VAR 
refers to ONE (unit vector) (Specification (1)), GINI (specification (2)), GS (specification (3)), and ET (specification 
(4)). All regressions include year-fixed effects (coefficients’ estimates not reported). Heteroskedasticity robust p-
values are in parentheses. A constant term is included in each regression. *, ** and *** Significant at the 10 
percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. Variable definitions for the acronyms are reported in Table 4. 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
RISK  0.183 0.174 0.216 0.172 
  (0.148) (0.176) (0.076) (0.175) 
SALESGR  0.380*** 0.387*** 0.406*** 0.418*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (<.0001) 
SIZE  -0.457*** -0.478*** -0.444*** -0.424*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
IND1  1.710*** 1.783*** 1.730*** 1.594*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
IND2  -1.626*** -1.710*** -1.671*** -1.617*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
IND3  -0.853** -0.827* -0.877** -0.801* 
  (0.056) (0.062) (0.044) (0.082) 
IND4  0.271 0.237 0.264 0.271 
  (0.317) (0.376) (0.330) (0.316) 
IND5  0.498** 0.517** 0.554** 0.553** 
  (0.043) (0.036) (0.026) (0.023) 
LATE  -0.295 -0.278 -0.546 -0.213 
  (0.394) (0.423) (0.113) (0.528) 
LAW  -0.969** -0.963**  -1.697***  -1.048** 
  (0.044) (0.040) (0.000) (0.023) 
JUDICIAL  0.007 0.017 0.066 -0.021 
  (0.942) (0.851) (0.481) (0.813) 
GINI  0.024  0.034  0.016 
  (0.290)  (0.114)  (0.501) 
GS  0.161** 0.152**    0.192** 
  (0.031) (0.040)    (0.011) 
ET  0.352*** 0.341*** 0.436***   
  (0.001) (0.001)  (<.0001)   
VAR*REGION1  -1.692*** -0.016  -0.093  0.050 
  (<.0001) (0.470)  (0.326)  (0.710) 
VAR*REGION2  2.412*** 0.071*** 0.368*** 0.933*** 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
VAR*REGION3  -0.716** 0.009  0.054  0.189* 
  (0.016) (0.691) (0.446) (0.087) 
VAR*REGION4  -0.005 0.027 0.066  0.394*** 
  (0.988) (0.226) (0.505) (0.001) 
      
Adjusted R2  0.497 0.496 0.491 0.501 
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